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A Comment on Chief Justice Burger's
Proposal for a Temporary Panel to
Resolve Intercircuit Conflicts
By WILLIAM ALSUP* AND TRACY L. SALISBURY**
Chief Justice Burger has expressed concern about the Supreme
Court's caseload since he joined the Court in 1969. Perhaps the most
tangible evidence of this concern was his appointment of a commission,
chaired by Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School, to study the
problem of the Court's burgeoning docket. That commission yielded
the controversial recommendation for the creation of a National Court
of Appeals that would screen all petitions for review filed in the Court
and refer only several hundred of the most "certworthy" to the
Supreme Court for its consideration; the remaining petitions would be
denied without further recourse to the Supreme Court.' The proposal
generated a barrage of criticism,2 primarily on the grounds that it
threatened to deprive the Supreme Court of control over its own docket
and to disrupt its orchestration of the development of case law.
As interest in the Freund Commission's plan faded, the Hruska
Commission, established by Congress to examine the workload of the
courts of appeals, advanced a proposal that overcame the major objec-
tion levied against the Freund plan. The Hruska Commission pro-
posed that the Supreme Court continue to review all petitions, but that
it refer as many cases as it wished to a National Court of Appeals,
instructing the new court either that it must decide the cases or that it
* B.S., 1967, Mississippi State University; J.D., M.P.P., 1971, Harvard University.
B.A., 1979, University of South Carolina; J.D., 1982, University of South Carolina
School of Law.
I. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE
CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 590-91 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Freund Report].
2. See, e.g., Alsup, A PolicyAssessment of the National Court ofAppeals, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 1313, 1319-21 (1974); Goldberg, 7here Shall .e "One Supreme Court," 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 339 (1976).
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could decline review at its option. In this way, the Justices still would
have the full panoply of issues available to them, but could rely on the
National Court of Appeals to resolve "lesser" issues. In addition, the
existing courts of appeals would be authorized under certain circum-
stances to refer issues of national importance to the new court.
4
The Hruska Commission advanced its proposal to address two of
the perceived problems facing the federal judiciary: (1) the balkaniza-
tion of national law through uniesolved conflicts among the circuits,
and (2) inadequate supervision by the Supreme Court over the courts
of appeals.5 Numerous judges, lawyers, and teachers greeted this pro-
posal with broad reservations.6 Primary among the concerns were that
(1) the commission had exaggerated the extent to which there was a
lack of national appellate capacity; (2) the proposal itself had serious
drawbacks, including adverse effects on the Supreme Court's power,
prestige, and procedure; and (3) better solutions existed, such as elimi-
nating direct appeals to the Supreme Court, eliminating diversity juris-
diction, and confining tax and patent cases to special tribunals.7
Opposition to the proposal prevailed, and interest in the management
of the Supreme Court's workload waned.
Chief Justice Burger recently has raised anew the argument that
the Supreme Court is overwhelmed. In brief, the Chief Justice main-
tains that the Court's workload is unacceptable because it compromises
the ability of the Justices to render thoughtful, wise adjudications.8 As
a remedy, the Chief Justice proposes that Congress establish a commis-
sion to study solutions to the Supreme Court's caseload management
problem, and calls for the establishment of a temporary panel to hear
intercircuit conflicts as an interim measure.' The Chief Justice's sug-
gestion comes at a time when many other Justices are decrying the on-
erous workload burden on the Court.' 0 This Commentary addresses
3. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and
Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 199-
200 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hruska Report].
4. Id.
5. Id at 216-18.
6. See generally Alsup, Reservations on the Proposal of the Hruska Commission to Es-
tablish a National Court ofAppeals, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 431 (1976).
7. Id. at 434.
8. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 443-45 (1983).
9. Id. at 446-47.
10. At the American Bar Association's midyear meeting in February, 1983, Justice
O'Connor joined Chief Justice Burger in urging that immediate steps be taken to reduce the
Supreme Court's workload. She recommended that Congress establish specialized courts of
appeals with exclusive jurisdiction in areas such as taxation, and suggested that Congress
eliminate the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction. See Middleton, Overload, 69 A.B.A.
the limits of the Chief Justice's proposal, the efficacy of the proposed
panel in reducing the Supreme Court's workload, and the impact of the
panel on intercircuit conflicts.
I. The Limits of the Chief Justice's Proposal
The Chief Justice's proposal, outlined in his 1983 Annual Report
on the State of the Judiciary, calls for the creation of a special, tempo-
rary panel of the new United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Chief Justice Burger proposes that two judges from each circuit
comprise the temporary panel, for a total pool of twenty-six judges.
Panels of seven or nine judges drawn from this pool would sit for peri-
ods of six months, hear and decide intercircuit conflict cases, and per-
haps resolve a defined category of statutory interpretation cases. The
Supreme Court, however, would retain certiorari jurisdiction over all
cases. The panel would have a limited five-year existence.
The Chief Justice further recommends that during the tenure of
this panel, a congressionally authorized committee, appointed by the
three branches of government, study remedies for what the Chief Jus-
tice characterizes as the "grave problem" of Supreme Court overload. I
J. 423 (1983). Justice Powell has joined in the latter recommendation and further has advo-
cated curtailing the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Powell, Are
the Federal Courts Becoming BureaucracesZ 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371-72 (1982).
Justice Stevens has generated controversy with his suggestion, reminiscent of the
Freund Commission recommendation, that a new court be formed to choose cases for
Supreme Court review. J. Stevens, Addressing the American Judicature Society (Aug. 6,
1982), reprintedin CRiM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, Aug. 16, 1982, at 6. Justice White apparently
favors the creation of courts with nationwide jurisdiction over appeals from the federal dis-
trict courts in particular subject areas: according to press reports, White has proposed that
to reduce the number of intercircuit conflicts the Supreme Court must resolve, a circuit
should be required to go en banc before disagreeing with another court of appeals, and that
the first en banc decision should be the nationwide rule. CRaiM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, Sept.
27, 1982, at 5. Justice Brennan finally seems to have joined those members of the Court who
perceive a danger in the ever increasing workload; he recommends (1) greater care by the
Court in selecting cases for review; (2) the repeal of all the Court's mandatory appeal juris-
diction; and (3) the immediate study of Justice White's proposals. Brennan, Some Thoughts
on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230, 235 (1983). Justice Brennan em-
phatically rejects Justice Stevens' suggestion, observing that the plan "would destroy the role
of the Supreme Court as the framers envisaged it." Id at 234.
11. Chief Justice Burger specified four proposals that should be evaluated: first, not
surprisingly, is the familiar plan for a National Court of Appeals to hear cases transferred to
it by the Supreme Court; second, a proposal by the former Chief Justice of Arizona, James
Duke Cameron, for an intermediate National Court of State Appeals to review state court
decisions on federal constitutional law; third, a proposal to create two intermediate courts of
appeals, one for criminal cases and one for civil; and fourth, that nine additional Justices be
authorized as a separate panel of the Supreme Court with jurisdiction over all cases not of a
criminal or constitutional nature. Burger, supra note 8, 69 A.B.A.J. at 446-47.
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To facilitate the committee's evaluation, the temporary panel would be
required to report annually to Congress, the President, and the Judici-
ary Conference of the United States.
Although the exact parameters of Chief Justice Burger's proposal
are not clear, they appear to be quite limited. The Chief Justice's pri-
mary concern is that the Supreme Court's current workload of approxi-
mately 150 cases on the plenary docket imposes an intolerable burden
on the Court, thereby undermining its ability to fulfill its duties
thoughtfully and effectively. The proposal thus contemplates a reduc-
tion of thirty-five to fifty argued cases per year, thereby bringing the
number of cases on the plenary docket down to around one hundred
cases, a level which the Chief Justice believes is desirable.'"
The Chief Justice proposes to effect this reduction by using the
temporary panel to take over part of the Court's caseload, and has de-
fined the cases appropriate for the panel's consideration primarily with
reference to whether the case implicates an intercircuit conflict.' 3 This
aspect of the proposal may reawaken the debate over whether the
Supreme Court fails to resolve significant intercircuit conflicts
promptly, thereby undermining certainty and uniformity in our judicial
system. It should be stressed, however, that Chief Justice Burger has
not proposed the creation of a National Court of Appeals, which pro-
ponents suggest would provide sufficient appellate capacity to resolve
the conflicts that currently remain unreviewed or unresolved by the
Supreme Court. Rather, the Chief Justice's proposal appears to con-
template only that the temporary panel would relieve the Supreme
Court of hearing the thirty-five to fifty intercircuit conflict cases that
the Chief Justice apparently estimates are before the Court each
Term. 4 Thus, the Chief Justice has focused on the narrow goal of re-
12. Id. at 447.
13. Chief Justice Burger also suggests that the panel might hear a "defined category of
statutory interpretation cases." Id. Rather than speculate on what the Chief Justice has in
mind, this Commentary will be limited to a discussion of the temporary panel's role in
resolving intercircuit conflicts.
14. At least two other commentators appear to share this appraisal of the Chief Justice's
proposal. See Hellman, How Not to Help the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 750, 752 (1983);
Address by Senator Howell Heflin, American Bar Association Judicial Administration Divi-
sion (July 29, 1983), in Heflin, How Do You Spell Judicial Relie , JUDGES J., Fall, 1983, at
16. It is possible that the Chief Justice anticipates that the Supreme Court will refer far
more cases to the temporary panel than it would have heard itself, but a plan under which
the new panel would hear every case involving an intercircuit conflict would be, in effect, a
National Court of Appeals such as the Hruska Commission envisioned. Such a plan would
not be in keeping with Chief Justice Burger's desire to study the advisability of a National
Court of Appeals, as well as other proposals, before implementing a permanent structural
change.
ducing the Supreme Court's workload and offers no proposal for im-
mediately expanding appellate capacity; these long term solutions are
left to the tri-partite committee.
In keeping with the panel's proposed function as an overflow
chamber for the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice apparently intends
that the panel hear cases on referral only. Presumably the Supreme
Court would review petitions for certiorari in the same manner that it
does now, but in addition to the alternatives presently available, the
Court would have the option of referring a case to the new panel.
With the parameters of the program established, reservations
about the proposal center primarily upon the efficacy of the proposed
panel in either reducing the Court's workload or resolving intercircuit
conflicts.
II. The Efficacy of the Proposed Panel in Reducing the
Supreme Court's Workload
The Chief Justice's goal is to reduce the Supreme Court's work-
load to approximately 100 cases per year. There can be no guarantee,
however, that the number of cases accepted each Term will fall to any
particular level; rather, the Court might divert its energies to hearing
the cases that are "next in line" after the cases involving intercircuit
conflicts. 5 The number of argued cases has averaged about 150 for
almost twenty-five years," which suggests that 150 cases is neither an
impossible nor, perhaps, an undesirable caseload for the members of
the Court.
The operation of the temporary panel to resolve intercircuit con-
flicts raises more serious questions about the efficacy of the proposal.
Presumably, the Chief Justice has decided that the Court should refer
cases involving intercircuit conflicts to the new panel because propo-
nents of a National Court of Appeals maintain that a structural change
is essential for resolving intercircuit conflicts that the Supreme Court
currently is unable to address. 7 The temporary panel thus provides a
15. The Justices might also be inclined to give plenary consideration to cases that other-
wise would be subject to summary disposition. Hellman, supra note 14, at 752-53.
16. Freund Report, supra note 1, 57 F.R.D. at 619. The number of plenary decisions
has hovered around 170 over the past decade. Hellman; The Supreme Court, the National
Law, and the Selection of Casesfor the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PnT. L. Rav. 521, 525 (1983).
17. The Hruska Commission, for example, maintained that the Supreme Court, since it
decides only about 150 cases annually, is unable to rule on numerous issues of national
significance. The Commission was most concerned about the Court's failure to resolve
promptly all conflicts among the circuits; the Commission concluded that many of these
conflicts do not warrant the Supreme Court's time but do deserve resolution at the national
Smrina 19841 INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS
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testing ground for the ability of a body other than the Supreme Court
to establish and enforce uniform rules. The following additional bur-
dens that the panel would impose on the Court, however, may out-
weigh any benefit to be gained by the potential caseload reduction.
First, the nine Justices will have to decide whether a case involves
an intercircuit conflict so that the Court may refer it to the new panel.
The existence of a conflict is not always obvious. Indeed, persons stud-
ying the existence of conflicts in cases before the Supreme Court have
had to develop several classifications to account for the various ways in
which a conflict may present itself. Thus, for example, a case may in-
volve a direct conflict, a strong partial conflict, a weak partial conflict,
or no genuine conflict.'8 Further, commentators have disagreed over
whether specific cases actually raise intercircuit conflicts.' 9 There is no
reason to suspect that the Justices will have an easier time than anyone
else in evaluating a case for the existence of a conflict; if anything, the
process will be complicated by the Justices' attitudes toward the under-
lying substantive issues in each case. Thus, the determination of
whether a case is a proper one for referral to the new, limited panel will
be difficult, requiring significant additional time and effort.
Second, the Court will not base all referral decisions solely on a
determination of whether a case raises an intercircuit conflict. Al-
though the Chief Justice speaks of referring all intercircuit conflicts to
level. See Hruska Report, supra note 3, 67 F.R.D. at 221. See also Freund Report, supra
note 1, 57 F.R.D. at 592. More recently, see, e.g., Heflin, supra note 14, at 19; Olson, Opening
Statement, 8 LrrIGATION 1 (1982).
18. See Feeney, Conflicts Involving Federal Law: A Review of Cases Presented to the
Supreme Court, 67 F.R.D. 301, 305-06 (1975). Professor Feeney defined a "direct conflict"
case as one "in which the decision below deals with the same explicit point as some other
case and reaches a contradictory result," a "strong partial conflict" case as one in which the
implications of the decision below conflict with the result of another decision in the same
area of law, and a "weak partial conflict" case as one in which "there is some degree of
legitimacy to the claim of conflict but where the conflict is more attenuated than in the
strong partial category." Id.
Given these classifications, it is easy to imagine that "[t]he judgment as to whether a
conflict exists or not is often quite a difficult one." Id. at 306. Thus, to assure some degree of
uniformity in classification, Professor Feeney had two to three people review most cases
initially classified as direct or strong partial conflicts. Id
A final category of conflict cases, "no genuine conflict," is reserved for those cases in
which the parties claim that a conflict exists but closer examination reveals none. Attorneys
may claim a conflict in such a case in hope that the Supreme Court will be more inclined to
grant review. Id at 305-06. Thus, while an intercircuit conflict appears to be the quickest
and easiest way to identify cases to refer to the proposed panel, in reality it is probably the
most unreliable.
19. Compare Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARv. L. REv. 465 (1953)
with Roehner & Roehner, Certiorari-What Is a Conflict Between Circuits?, 20 U. CHI. L.
REv. 656 (1953). See also Alsup, supra note 6, at 435-46.
the panel, he must contemplate that the Supreme Court would be able
to reserve some such cases for its own review. In certain cases, for ex-
ample, the Court may expect that the panel will reach a result different
from that the Court would reach; if so, referral to the panel would only
delay Supreme Court review, not eliminate it. This occurrence would
only prolong uncertainty, undermine the authority of the new panel,
and require litigants to jump through an additional appellate hoop.
The careful selection of cases for the panel will impose an additional
burden on the Justices and thus constitute a hidden cost of the Chief
Justice's proposal.
Third, there is the distinct possibility that the Supreme Court will
be obligated to review a substantial number of the cases it initially re-
fers to the new panel. Although the Chief Justice dismisses this possi-
bility as insignificant,20 it is inherent in a proposal that the panel hear
many cases that the Supreme Court would have heard under the old
system. Certainly the losing litigant will request review, and the issue
may still be sufficiently "certworthy" in light of the opinion of the
panel to warrant review by the Supreme Court.
To the extent the Supreme Court did review the decisions of the
panel, it would simply be duplicating the work of the new court. More-
over, the ever present hope of ultimate review by the Supreme Court
would keep the litigation alive and thus would not necessarily termi-
nate other litigants' hopes that they could win Supreme Court review
on the same issue. Consequently, the panel decisions would cause some
reduction, but not complete elimination of uncertainty.
Fourth, another problem associated with referral cases is the ques-
tion of the propriety of Supreme Court jurisdiction itself. Since all re-
ferral cases would be channeled through the Supreme Court, the
panel's referral jurisdiction would necessarily depend upon whether or
not jurisdiction would have been proper in the Supreme Court. Issues
of Supreme Court jurisdiction-both statutory and constitutional-are
often latent, raised only at argument or after submission. Such ques-
tions inevitably would surface in cases the Supreme Court referred to
the panel, which would then be required to determine the scope of the
appellate or certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
A decision in favor of jurisdiction would result in pressure on the
Supreme Court to acquiesce to the jurisdictional point on review, lest
the Supreme Court repudiate jurisdiction and render the earlier deci-
20. Chief Justice Burger is confident that "26 experienced judges assigned in this man-
ner would resolve the conflicts among the circuits in such a way that the Supreme Court
would not often grant further review." Burger, supra note 8, at 447.
Svrins 19841 INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS
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sion by the panel void. Moreover, regardless of how the new court
resolved the jurisdictional issue, the precedent would remain for the
Supreme Court to face when the same issue later arose. Asking the
Supreme Court to avoid this by not referring cases with latent jurisdic-
tional issues would be unworkable since considerable study would be
required to ferret out such problems. Since the Supreme Court would
probably decide not to review every referral case for latent jurisdic-
tional defects, it would occasionally feel bound to review immediately a
decision of the panel ruling on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Not
to do so would induce misplaced reliance on the decision if the
Supreme Court later held jurisdiction to be improper.
Fifth, at the certiorari screening stage, the Court probably would
feel obligated to study the decisions of the temporary panel in more
detail than the decisions of other courts. This precaution would reduce
the number of times the Supreme Court permitted a decision of the
panel to stand only to be convinced it was erroneous in a subsequent
case. Although such close scrutiny would be no guarantee against a
later reversal, it would reduce the risk of reversal. Nevertheless, it
would constitute yet another demand on the time of the Justices.
In light of (1) the significant additional burdens the new panel
would impose on the Supreme Court, and (2) the probability that in
many cases the panel would only delay, not replace Supreme Court
review, the question arises as to whether it is worth creating a new
panel merely to reduce the Supreme Court's workload by an unknown
number of cases.21 If the members of the Court insist that major struc-
tural reforms are necessary, then no one can reasonably quarrel with
the Chief Justice's proposal to study permanent solutions to the prob-
lem of the ever increasing workload burdens on the Court. It seems
unnecessary, however, to implement an experimental panel with the
limited role of reducing the number of Supreme Court cases to a level
significantly below the capacity at which the Court has managed to
function for well over twenty years.
III. The Temporary Panel and the Resolution of Intercircuit
Conflicts
For reasons discussed above, the Chief Justice has chosen cases
involving intercircuit conflicts, however defined, as the test cases for the
temporary panel. The Chief Justice's limited proposal does not impli-
cate the entire range of issues in the controversy over whether the ap-
21. Professor Heliman has also voiced this concern. HeUman, supra note 14, at 752.
INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS
pellate capacity of the federal courts must be expanded to
accommodate the resolution of more conflicts.22 Even so, the new
panel should not be implemented unless it can be expected to resolve
conflicts at least as well as the Supreme Court can. The nature and
structure of the proposed panel, however, militate against this result.
As noted above, the temporary panel would be comprised of a
pool of twenty-six judges, two from each circuit. From this pool,
panels of seven or nine judges would sit for periods of six months. This
procedure virtually guarantees uncertainty, conflicting decisions and
ultimate Supreme Court review of many cases referred to the panel.
The panel's decisions will be easily undermined by the Supreme
Court, especially in the event of a divided panel. For example, the
panel may render a 4-3 decision in one area of law, by employing in
part general principles of statutory interpretation. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court may issue a decision in which it follows a contrary rule.
The panel's decision would be called into question; uncertainty would
still prevail.
As a more general matter, it is easy to foresee that the panel's deci-
sions, especially split decisions, will not satisfy litigants who view the
panel as just another step toward Supreme Court review. Moreover,
the lower courts are more likely to find ways around the panel's deci-
sion than around the Supreme Court's, again especially in the event of
a divided panel. Nor is the prospect of conflict on the panel far-
fetched; indeed, such conflict would appear inevitable on a panel com-
prised of members from eleven circuits, whose task is to resolve intercir-
cult conflicts.
The constantly changing composition of the panel would also en-
courage practitioners, disappointed with one ruling, to bring a similar
but arguably distinguishable case before another panel. This would oc-
cur even absent an intervening Supreme Court decision, in the hope of
achieving a more favorable result. Although it is questionable that res-
olution of a conflict by any court will significantly discourage litiga-
tion,23 a court without a significant degree of predictability and
22. These issues include whether a significant number of intercircuit conflicts go un-
resolved and whether the prompt resolution of all intercircuit conflicts is necessarily desira-
ble. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 435-46.
23. The Hruska Commission suggested that disagreement between two circuits induces
substantially more litigation in other circuits than when the circuits agree. See Hruska Re-
port, supra note 3, 67 F.R.D. at 206,207,217-34. Neither the Commission, nor anyone since,
marshalled empirical evidence in support of this conclusion; even if there may be a germ of
truth in the claim, it has important qualifications. For example, the number of patent in-
fringement actions, a conflict presented by the Commission, id at 228, will not vary depend-
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consistency cannot begin to impress potential litigants with the finality
and uniformity of its decisions. Consistent development in the law
cannot be expected when the only common link between the cases
heard by a special court will be the existence of a conffict. Thus, the
panel will not guide or direct the development of a coherent policy in
any given area, but will hand down isolated rulings at the same time
that the Supreme Court and other courts of appeals are making rules
affecting other aspects of the underlying substantive law. Thus, instead
of clarifying the law for the lower courts, the new court will provide yet
another source of precedent for the lower courts to reconcile with other
lines of authority.24
Finally, the structure apparently contemplated by the Chief Justice
insures that Supreme Court review of the panel's decisions will be
granted frequently. By the Chief Justice's estimate, thirty-five to fifty
of the approximately 150 cases heard per year fall into the "intercircuit
conflict" category, for it is by this number that the Chief Justice hopes
the panel will reduce the Supreme Court's plenary docket. These cases
are cases that the Supreme Court would otherwise hear-they are not
the cases which would, for one reason or another, go unheard.
These intercircuit conflict cases often raise important issues that
require final Supreme Court review. Thus, the Supreme Court is quick
to grant certiorari in cases presenting conflicts that could affect the ad-
ministration of the national government and the administration of the
armed services, 2 and has been prompt to review conflicts over impor-
tant substantive rights to avoid the inequity of opposite results under a
ing on disagreement or uniformity as to whether obviousness (Le. invention) is a jury or
judge question. The number of lawsuits will stay the same, although a conflict may admit-
tedly encourage counsel to add another issue to an already protracted case. Similarly, the
number of plaintiffs' claims against third party defendants, id, does not depend upon
whether or not an independent basis of jurisdiction over such claim is necessary. The an-
swer to that question only determines when and in what court the claim will be litigated.
Moreover, the imagination of lawyers never sleeps in identifying plausible grounds for dis-
tinguishing even a result reached unanimously by all other courts; once a conflict is put to
rest, resourceful counsel will shift attention to new ways to distinguish his or her case. Ac-
cordingly, even a permanent National Court of Appeals would probably not reduce substan-
tially the caseload of the lower courts, but would merely alter the composition of the issues
in those cases. See Hruska Report, supra note 3, 67 F.R.D. at 227-34.
24. See Hellman, supra note 14, at 753.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 104 S. Ct. 2769 (1984) (United States government
liability for honoring garnishment notice served on Air Force officer "creates a substantial
risk of imposing significant liabilities upon the United States... and.., created a conflict
in the Circuits"); Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191 (1980) (conflict in decisions
interpreting Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974).
non-uniform law.26 These categories of conflict are the most signifi-
cant, and the Supreme Court has faithfully decided them as they arise.
The temporary panel cannot and should not be expected authori-
tatively to resolve conflicts in the categories described above. In those
cases only a Supreme Court decision can be expected to settle the law
or have a significant impact on subsequent litigation. Consequently,
Supreme Court referral of the type of intercircuit conflict cases it pres-
ently hears will often only delay ultimate Supreme Court review.27
As litigants and lower courts insist on Supreme Court resolution of
these significant issues, the frequent review of panel decisions will pres-
ent distinct problems affecting the power and prestige of both the
Supreme Court and the temporary panel. Assuming that the Supreme
Court would be permitted to retain some cases involving intercircuit
conflicts for its own resolution, referral jurisdiction would allow the
Court some control over the frequency of reversals through the careful
selection of referred cases. Indeed, the fear that substantial issues
would be decided incorrectly, thereby resulting in a loss of prestige for
both national tribunals, would pressure the Supreme Court not to refer
a large number of substantial issues to the new court. The Justices,
however, also would be motivated in the opposite direction by their
desire to cooperate with Congress and facilitate the reduction in
caseload contemplated by the proposal. Where the Justices would
strike the balance between these conflicting goals is a matter of conjec-
ture, but some risk of loss of prestige and authority is inevitable. Any
hesitance by the Supreme Court in referring substantive issues to the
panel reduces the efficiency of the proposal in fulfilling its primary
goal-reducing the Supreme Court's workload.
It is worth pausing to observe the relationship between the fre-
quency of review of panel decisions by the Supreme Court and the
number of important decisions referred to the new court, and the de-
gree of certainty such panel decisions would achieve. If the Supreme
Court pursued a policy of infrequent review, presumably it also would
be reluctant to refer more than a few cases of substantial importance.
26. See, eag., Hobby v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984) (discrimination in selection
of grand jury foreman); Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217 (1984) (imposition of
longer sentence after retrial following successful appeal).
27. This delay will prevent prompt elimination of uncertainty in the law. Since any
holding of the panel will be subject to eventual Supreme Court review, issues decided by the
panel will not produce complete certainty until put to rest by the Supreme Court. It must
also be remembered that at present a holding by a circuit does achieve a modicum of cer-
tainty within its jurisdiction. Consequently, it would only be within those circuits that have
not passed on an issue that a holding by the panel would more firmly, albeit not conclu-
sively, establish the law.
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Conversely, the greater the frequency of review by the Supreme Court,
the more liberal the Supreme Court would be in referring important
cases. The frequency of review will determine the degree of finality
and certainty resulting from the decisions of the panel. If this set of
relationships is valid, then it follows that the panel will not be able both
to reduce uncertainty and resolve a large number of important cases. If
this set of relationships is invalid, it is because the Supreme Court
would be forced to share with the panel the power to decide questions
of great import without any effective review of panel decisions by the
Supreme Court. Naturally, this would diminish the authority and posi-
tion of the Supreme Court in our political system.
Conclusion
It is, of course, the exceptional Supreme Court case that settles
once and for all a recurring legal issue.2" Why make even a temporary
structural change in the appellate system, however, if there will be no
improvement in either the Supreme Court's net workload or in the res-
olution of important intercircuit conflicts? It is far from clear that a
simple reduction of the Supreme Court's caseload is worth the addition
of another layer to the appellate process, another court to the list of
courts generating conflicting precedent, and another burden to the al-
ready overworked courts of appeals.
Although we believe these concerns are valid, we are equally im-
pressed by Chief Justice Burger's commitment and obvious concern
over the caseload problem, a concern shared by other Justices.29 The
Justices themselves are truly in the best position to determine when
their caseload becomes so heavy that it limits their power to reflect on
and thoughtfully consider the cases they do decide. Consequently, we
are in full agreement with the Chief Justice's call for a tripartite com-
mission to study the problem in depth, weigh the competing considera-
tions, and make an informed judgment and recommendation.
28. See HeUman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?
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29. See supra note 10.
